The purpose of this page is to answer the most commonly asked questions
concerning honeypot technologies, including what is a honeypot, what's
its value, how do they work, and what are the different types. Most of
this information was obtained from the
honeypot mailing list.
This FAQ is maintained by
Shaheem Motlekar
Last Modified: 25 March, 2004
Getting Started
How do honeypots work?
What is the value of a honeypot, what can it do
for me?
What are the advantages of a honeypot?
What are the disadvantages of a honeypot?
What are the different types off honeypots?
Which one is best?
I've never worked with honeypots, where should I start?
What are the legal issues of honeypots?
Where can I learn more about honeypots?
Where can I learn more about Honeyd?
What are Honeynets?
What is GenI or GenII mean?
What is a Honeywall?
What are virtual honeynets?
What are Honeytokens?
Can honeypots monitor unused IP space?
Data Control: How can I control what the bad guy is doing?
Data Capture: How can I capture what the bad guy is doing?
Where can I learn more about Dynamic Honeypots?
How do I redirect all hostile traffic headed towards my
production environment towards a honeypot?
What is Honeyd? Why does everyone talk about it?
Is there a Honeyd FAQ?
Technical Questions
What is a honeypot?
A honeypot is a security resource who's value lies in being probed,
attacked, or compromised. Unlike firewalls or IDS sensors, honeypots
are something you want the bad guys to interact with. To learn
more about what honeypots are all about, you may want to start with
the paper Honeypots:
Definitions and Values. You can also learn about all the different
OpenSource and Commercial honeypots at Honeypot
Solutions.
Conceptually, honeypots are very simple. They are a resource that
has no production value, it has no authorized activity. Whenever
there is any interaction with a honeypot, this is most likely malicious
activity. For example, if you have someone on your internal network
scanning for vulnerable desktops, and the attacker scans your internal
honeypot, your honeypot will easily detect and log this unauthorized
activity as no one should be interacting with it.
Honeypots are unique, they don't solve a specific problem. Instead,
they are a highly flexible tool with many different applications to security.
It all depends on what you want to achieve. Some honeypots can be used to help
prevent attacks, others can be used to detect attacks, while other honeypots
can be used for information gathering and research.
Honeypots have several powerful advantages. They include:
Honeypots also have their disadvantages. This is why they do not replace any
existing technologies. Instead they work with and compliment your existing
infrastructure. Below is just a highlight of two issues. To learn more about
the problems with honeypots, review the paper Problems and Challenges with Honeypots.
In general, there are two different types, low-interaction and high-interaction.
Level of interaction measures how much activity, or interaction, an attacker
can have with a honeypot. Low interaction honeypots limit the level
of interaction by emulating services. The interaction an attacker
has with the honeypot is limited by how advance the emulation of the
service is. An example of a low interaction honeypot is
Honeyd. In contrast, high interaction honeypots do not emulate
services, instead they provide real applications for attackers to
interact with. An example of a high interaction honeypot is
Honeynets.
Neither is better then the other. Low interaction is
simpler to deploy and has less risk (as the attacker can do less),
but you can not learn as much. With a high level of interaction
you can learn a great deal, as the attacker has a real operating
system and applications to interact with. However, this comes at
a cost, as the more interaction you provide, the more complex and
greater risk you have.
There really is no single best honeypot. Low and High interaction honeypots
have their advantages and disadvantages. In general, if you just want to
use honeypots as detection devices or burglar alarms, low-interaction may
be what you want. If you are looking to gather extensive information on
threats, you may want to first consider high-interaction solutions.
If you are new to the world of honeypots and want to learn what they are
all about BackOfficer
Friendly is the easiest place to start. This is an extremely simple and basic
honeypot that can run on any Windows systems. Its very limited in its capabilities,
but its excellent for demonstrating honeypot concepts (and its FREE!). For
more advance users who prefer Unix,
Honeyd is an OpenSource solution for Unix.
As a new technology, people often ask what are the legal issues of honeypots.
While honeypots are not specifically addressed in federal statutes or regulation,
the following issues can be seen as a starting point. For specific information,
refer to the paper Honeypots:
Are They Illegal?. Last, be sure to review with your own legal counsel.
One of the best ways to learn about honeypots is from the security community.
Its highly recommended you join the
Honeypot mailing list to ask questions and learn about honeypot technologies.
Also, its high recommended your first read a series of
honeypot whitepapers published by the security community.
Honeyd is one of the most powerful, and most likely the most commonly used
OpenSource honeypot. You can learn more at
Honeyd Homepage. You can also check out the
Honeyd FAQ.
Honeynets are one type of honeypot, specifically they are a high-interaction honeypot.
Honeynets are entire networks or real systems designed to be compromised.
You can learn more about honeynets at the
Know Your Enemy: Honeynets.
There are currently two different types of Honeynets, GenI or GenII.
These are acronyms for 1st Generation or 2nd Generation technologies.
GenI (or 1st Generation) Honeynets use basic technologies to capture
and control attacker activity. Mainly a layer three firewall that
counts outbound connections. A GenII (or 2nd Generation) Honeynet is
more advance technologies, specifically a layer two bridge that can
not only count connections, but block or modify outbound attacks.
It also uses more advance tools for capturing attackers keystrokes.
You can learn more about GenI and GenII at
Know Your Enemy:
Honeynets.
A Honeywall is the honeynet gateway used to implement data control and
data capture. Normally it operates as a layer two bridgeg between the
honeypots in your honeynet, and your production network. This is one of
the most critical elements of a honeynet. You can learn more about
the Honeywall in the paper
Know Your Enemy: GenII.
Virtual honeynets are one type of honeynet, specifically honeynets
that run multiple operating systems on the same physical computer. This
is done using virtualization software such as VMware or User-Mode Linux.
You can learn more about virtual honeynets, the different types,
and how to deploy them, at
Know Your Enemy:
Virtual Honeynets.
Honeytokens is a term first published by Augusto Paes de Barros. While
the concept is not new, the term is. A Honeytoken is a resource, such
as a Word document, Excel spreadsheet, or some other type of data, that
has no production value or authorized activity. If someone attempts to
access or retrieve this data, they are committing an unauthorized act
(intentionally or unintentionally). One example of their use would
be to have IDS sensors configured to look for someone accessing or
transferring a Honeytoken. To learn more about Honeytokens, refer to
the paper Honeytokens:
The Other Honeypot.
Most definitely. We mentioned that one of the disadvantages of honeypots
is that they capture traffic only interacting directly to them. To increase the
odds of that happening, some honeypots work by monitoring all of your unused
IP space. If anyone (or anything) attempts to interact with an IP address that
does not have a computer assigned to it, some honeypots can dynamically take over
that IP address, assume the identity of the victim, and then interact with the attacker.
Two such examples are LaBrea
Tarpit and Honeyd.
Both work on the concept of ARP spoofing.
A critical element to most honeypots, especially Honeynets, is data control, the
ability to contain the activity of a bad guy. The purpose of data control is to
allow the attacker to gain access and control a honeypot, but not allow them to go
back outbound and harm any non-honeypot systems. Some honeypots, mainly
low interaction
honeypots, do not require data control, as the honeypots do not allow attackers
full access to the operating system. High interaction honeypots do require
data control. Examples of data control would be a firewall allowing attackers
inbound access to the honeypots (so they could attack them) but the same firewall
would then block all outbound attacks from the honeypot. You can learn more about
different data control solutions at the
Honeynet Tools Page.
A critical element to any honeypot is data capture, the ability to log, alert,
and capture everything the bad guy is doing. Most honeypot solutions, such
as Honeyd or Specter, have their own logging and alerting capabilities. However,
you may want additional data capturing mechanisms to enhance
the capabilities of these honeypots. Also, some solutions require you to deploy
you own data capture capabilities, for example solutions such as Honeynets. I
highly recommend you deploy Snort with any
honeypot deployment. Snort is an OpenSource IDS system that will not only detect
and alert any attacks against your honeypot, but it can capture the packets
and packet payloads involved in the attack. This information can prove critical
in analyzing the attackers activities. If you require more advance data capture
capabilities (such as with SSH sessions), I recommend you check out the
Honeynet Tools Page
for a complete listing of different tools used to capture what the bad guys are
doing.
Dynamic Honeypots are the concept where a honeypot application passively learns your network,
then dynamically creates virtual honeypots that mirror and populate your network. The
concept was first discussed in the paper
Dynamic Honeypots.
Concept code has also been developed to demonstrate this.
Well, Bait and Switch is the answer
for it. It works on the principle of redirecting all
hostile traffic towards a honeypot that is to an extent mirroring the production systems.
The difference is that the honeypots do not have actual sensitive information; but the
attacker ends up trying to attack the honeypots. In addition to the fact that your
production environment is safe you also get to learn about the attacker. The system is
based on snort, linux iproute2, netfilter and custom code.
Honeyd is a very powerful and flexible OpenSource
honeypot developed and maintained by Niels Provos. As this is an OpenSource solution,
its free to use and easy to customize. Often developers will try out new honeypot
features using Honeyd, such as dynamic honeypots or tarpitting. In many ways, Honeyd
is not a honeypot, but a honeypot toolkit, allowing you to build and customize the
solution you want. The reason many people discuss or use Honeyd is because it is arguably
one of the most powerful low-interaction OpenSource honeypots.
Yup. If you have a problem with Honeyd, its HIGHLY recommended you start with
the Honeyd FAQ first.